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https://github.com/jam422470459/EPD-nRF52-hema213.git
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532 lines
18 KiB
C
532 lines
18 KiB
C
/**
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* Copyright (c) 2016 - 2017, Nordic Semiconductor ASA
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*
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* All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without modification,
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* are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice, this
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* list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form, except as embedded into a Nordic
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* Semiconductor ASA integrated circuit in a product or a software update for
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* such product, must reproduce the above copyright notice, this list of
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* conditions and the following disclaimer in the documentation and/or other
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* materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* 3. Neither the name of Nordic Semiconductor ASA nor the names of its
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* contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this
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* software without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* 4. This software, with or without modification, must only be used with a
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* Nordic Semiconductor ASA integrated circuit.
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*
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* 5. Any software provided in binary form under this license must not be reverse
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* engineered, decompiled, modified and/or disassembled.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY NORDIC SEMICONDUCTOR ASA "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS
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* OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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* OF MERCHANTABILITY, NONINFRINGEMENT, AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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* DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL NORDIC SEMICONDUCTOR ASA OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
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* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE
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* GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
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* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT
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* OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*
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*/
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#include <stdbool.h>
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#include <stdint.h>
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#include "es_security.h"
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#include "aes.h"
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#include "app_timer.h"
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#include "cifra_eax_aes.h"
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#include "es_flash.h"
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#include "es_stopwatch.h"
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#include "fds.h"
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#include "modes.h"
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#include "occ_curve25519.h"
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#include "occ_hmac_sha256.h"
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#define TK_ROLLOVER 0x10000
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#define NONCE_SIZE (6)
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#define TAG_SIZE (2)
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#define SALT_SIZE (2)
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#define TLM_DATA_SIZE (ES_TLM_LENGTH - 2)
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#define EIK_SIZE (ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE)
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/**@brief Timing structure. */
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typedef struct
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{
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uint32_t time_counter;
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uint8_t k_scaler;
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} es_security_timing_t;
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/**@brief Security slot structure. */
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typedef struct
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{
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nrf_ecb_hal_data_t aes_ecb_ik;
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nrf_ecb_hal_data_t aes_ecb_tk;
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uint8_t eid[ES_EID_ID_LENGTH];
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es_security_timing_t timing;
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bool is_occupied;
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} es_security_slot_t;
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/**@brief Key pair structure. */
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typedef struct
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{
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uint8_t private[ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE];
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uint8_t public[ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE];
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} ecdh_key_pair_t;
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/**@brief ECDH structure. */
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typedef struct
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{
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ecdh_key_pair_t ecdh_key_pair;
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} es_security_ecdh_t;
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static nrf_ecb_hal_data_t m_aes_ecb_lk;
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static es_security_slot_t m_security_slot[APP_MAX_EID_SLOTS];
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static es_security_ecdh_t m_ecdh;
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static es_security_msg_cb_t m_security_callback;
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static es_stopwatch_id_t m_seconds_passed_sw_id;
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/**@brief Generates a EID with the Temporary Key*/
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static void eid_generate(uint8_t slot_no)
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{
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memset(m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.cleartext, 0, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.cleartext[11] = m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler;
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uint32_t k_bits_cleared_time =
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(m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter >> m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler)
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<< m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.cleartext[12] =
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(uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time >> 24) & 0xff);
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.cleartext[13] =
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(uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time >> 16) & 0xff);
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.cleartext[14] = (uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time >> 8) & 0xff);
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.cleartext[15] = (uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time) & 0xff);
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AES128_ECB_encrypt(m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.cleartext,
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.key,
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.ciphertext);
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memcpy(m_security_slot[slot_no].eid,
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.ciphertext,
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ES_EID_ID_LENGTH);
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m_security_callback(slot_no, ES_SECURITY_MSG_EID);
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}
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/**@brief Generates a temporary key with the Identity key. */
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static void temp_key_generate(uint8_t slot_no)
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{
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memset(m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.cleartext, 0, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.cleartext[11] = 0xFF;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.cleartext[14] =
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(uint8_t)((m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter >> 24) & 0xff);
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.cleartext[15] =
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(uint8_t)((m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter >> 16) & 0xff);
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AES128_ECB_encrypt(m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.cleartext,
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.key,
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.ciphertext);
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memcpy(m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_tk.key,
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m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.ciphertext,
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ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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static void check_rollovers_and_update_eid(uint8_t slot_no)
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{
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if (m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter % TK_ROLLOVER == 0)
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{
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temp_key_generate(slot_no);
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}
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/*lint -save -e573 */
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if ((m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter %
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(2 << (m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler - 1))) == 0)
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{
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eid_generate(slot_no);
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}
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/*lint -restore */
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}
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/**@brief Initialize lock code from flash. If it does not exist, copy from APP_CONFIG_LOCK_CODE.
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*/
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static void lock_code_init(uint8_t * p_lock_buff)
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{
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ret_code_t err_code;
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err_code = es_flash_access_lock_key(p_lock_buff, ES_FLASH_ACCESS_READ);
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FLASH_ACCES_ERROR_CHECK_ALLOW_NOT_FOUND(err_code);
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// If no lock keys exist, then generate one and copy it to buffer.
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if (err_code == FDS_ERR_NOT_FOUND)
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{
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uint8_t lock_code[16] = APP_CONFIG_LOCK_CODE;
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memcpy(p_lock_buff, lock_code, sizeof(lock_code));
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err_code = es_flash_access_lock_key(p_lock_buff, ES_FLASH_ACCESS_WRITE);
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APP_ERROR_CHECK(err_code);
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}
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}
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/**@brief Generates a the private/public ECDH key pair.
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*
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* @param[out] p_priv_buffer buffer of size 32 bytes to hold the private key.
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* @param[out] p_pub_buffer buffer of size 32 bytes to hold the public key.
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*/
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static void es_beacon_ecdh_pair_generate(uint8_t * p_priv_buffer, uint8_t * p_pub_buffer)
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{
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// Generate random beacon private key.
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uint8_t pool_size;
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uint8_t bytes_available;
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(void)sd_rand_application_pool_capacity_get(&pool_size);
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(void)sd_rand_application_bytes_available_get(&bytes_available);
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while (bytes_available < pool_size)
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{
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// wait for SD to acquire enough RNs.
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(void)sd_rand_application_bytes_available_get(&bytes_available);
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}
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(void)sd_rand_application_vector_get(p_priv_buffer, pool_size);
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if (pool_size < ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE)
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{
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(void)sd_rand_application_bytes_available_get(&bytes_available);
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while (bytes_available < (ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE - pool_size))
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{
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// Wait for SD to acquire enough RNs.
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(void)sd_rand_application_bytes_available_get(&bytes_available);
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}
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(void)sd_rand_application_vector_get(p_priv_buffer + pool_size,
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ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE - pool_size);
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}
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// Create beacon public 32-byte ECDH key from private 32-byte ECDH key.
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occ_curve25519_scalarmult_base(p_pub_buffer, p_priv_buffer);
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}
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void es_security_update_time(void)
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{
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static uint32_t timer_persist;
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uint32_t second_since_last_invocation = es_stopwatch_check(m_seconds_passed_sw_id);
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if (second_since_last_invocation > 0)
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{
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < APP_MAX_EID_SLOTS; ++i)
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{
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if (m_security_slot[i].is_occupied)
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{
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m_security_slot[i].timing.time_counter += second_since_last_invocation;
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check_rollovers_and_update_eid(i);
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}
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}
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// Every 24 hr, write the new EID timer to flash.
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timer_persist += second_since_last_invocation;
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const uint32_t TWENTY_FOUR_HOURS = 60 * 60 * 24;
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if (timer_persist >= TWENTY_FOUR_HOURS)
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{
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < APP_MAX_EID_SLOTS; ++i)
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{
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if (m_security_slot[i].is_occupied)
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{
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m_security_callback(i, ES_SECURITY_MSG_STORE_TIME);
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}
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}
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timer_persist = 0;
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}
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}
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}
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void es_security_eid_slots_restore(uint8_t slot_no,
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uint8_t k_scaler,
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uint32_t time_counter,
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const uint8_t * p_ik)
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{
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m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler = k_scaler;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter = time_counter;
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memcpy(m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.key, p_ik, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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m_security_slot[slot_no].is_occupied = true;
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m_security_callback(slot_no, ES_SECURITY_MSG_IK);
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temp_key_generate(slot_no);
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eid_generate(slot_no);
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}
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ret_code_t es_security_lock_code_update(uint8_t * p_ecrypted_key)
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{
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uint8_t temp_buff[ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE] = {0};
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AES128_ECB_decrypt(p_ecrypted_key, m_aes_ecb_lk.key, temp_buff);
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memcpy(m_aes_ecb_lk.key, temp_buff, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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return es_flash_access_lock_key(m_aes_ecb_lk.key, ES_FLASH_ACCESS_WRITE);
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}
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void es_security_unlock_prepare(uint8_t * p_challenge)
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{
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memcpy(m_aes_ecb_lk.cleartext, p_challenge, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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AES128_ECB_encrypt(m_aes_ecb_lk.cleartext, m_aes_ecb_lk.key, m_aes_ecb_lk.ciphertext);
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}
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void es_security_unlock_verify(uint8_t * p_unlock_token)
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{
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if (memcmp(p_unlock_token, m_aes_ecb_lk.ciphertext, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE) == 0)
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{
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m_security_callback(0, ES_SECURITY_MSG_UNLOCKED);
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}
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}
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ret_code_t es_security_random_challenge_generate(uint8_t * p_rand_chlg_buff)
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{
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return sd_rand_application_vector_get(p_rand_chlg_buff, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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void es_security_shared_ik_receive(uint8_t slot_no, uint8_t * p_encrypted_ik, uint8_t scaler_k)
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{
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m_security_slot[slot_no].is_occupied = true;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler = scaler_k;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter = APP_CONFIG_TIMING_INIT_VALUE;
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AES128_ECB_decrypt(p_encrypted_ik, m_aes_ecb_lk.key, m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.key);
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temp_key_generate(slot_no);
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eid_generate(slot_no);
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m_security_callback(slot_no, ES_SECURITY_MSG_IK);
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}
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void es_security_client_pub_ecdh_receive(uint8_t slot_no, uint8_t * p_pub_ecdh, uint8_t scaler_k)
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{
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static uint8_t attempt_counter = 0;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].is_occupied = true;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler = scaler_k;
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m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter = APP_CONFIG_TIMING_INIT_VALUE;
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uint8_t beacon_private[ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE]; // Beacon private ECDH key
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uint8_t beacon_public[ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE]; // Beacon public ECDH key
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uint8_t phone_public[ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE]; // Phone public ECDH key
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uint8_t shared[ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE]; // Shared secret ECDH key
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const uint8_t salt[1] = {0x01}; // Salt
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uint8_t identity_key[ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE]; // Identity Key
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// Get public 32-byte service ECDH key from phone.
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memcpy(phone_public, p_pub_ecdh, ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE);
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// Generate new set of keys for use with this EID slot.
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es_beacon_ecdh_pair_generate(beacon_private, beacon_public);
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memcpy(m_ecdh.ecdh_key_pair.private, beacon_private, ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE);
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memcpy(m_ecdh.ecdh_key_pair.public, beacon_public, ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE);
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// Generate shared 32-byte ECDH secret from beacon private service ECDH key and phone public ECDH key.
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occ_curve25519_scalarmult(shared, beacon_private, phone_public);
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// Generate key material using shared ECDH secret as salt and public_keys as key material. RFC 2104 HMAC-SHA256.
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uint8_t digest[64];
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uint8_t public_keys[64];
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memcpy(public_keys, phone_public, 32);
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memcpy(public_keys + 32, beacon_public, 32);
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occ_hmac_sha256(digest, public_keys, 64, shared, 32);
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// Zero check of the shared secret becoming zero, try generating a new key pair if so. Max attempt limit twice.
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uint8_t empty_check[32] = {0};
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if (memcmp(empty_check, shared, 32) == 0)
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{
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if (attempt_counter < 2)
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{
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attempt_counter++;
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es_beacon_ecdh_pair_generate(beacon_private, beacon_public);
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}
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}
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else
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{
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attempt_counter = 0;
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}
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// Generate 16-byte Identity Key from shared ECDH secret using RFC 2104 HMAC-SHA256 and salt.
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uint8_t digest_salted[64];
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occ_hmac_sha256(digest_salted, digest, 32, salt, 1);
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memcpy(identity_key, digest_salted, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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memcpy(m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.key, identity_key, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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temp_key_generate(slot_no);
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eid_generate(slot_no);
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m_security_callback(slot_no, ES_SECURITY_MSG_ECDH);
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m_security_callback(slot_no, ES_SECURITY_MSG_IK);
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}
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void es_security_pub_ecdh_get(uint8_t slot_no, uint8_t * p_edch_buffer)
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{
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memcpy(p_edch_buffer, m_ecdh.ecdh_key_pair.public, ESCS_ECDH_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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uint32_t es_security_clock_get(uint8_t slot_no)
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{
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return m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.time_counter;
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}
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void es_security_eid_slot_destroy(uint8_t slot_no)
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{
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memset(&m_security_slot[slot_no], 0, sizeof(es_security_slot_t));
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}
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uint8_t es_security_scaler_get(uint8_t slot_no)
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{
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return m_security_slot[slot_no].timing.k_scaler;
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}
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void es_security_eid_get(uint8_t slot_no, uint8_t * p_eid_buffer)
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{
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memcpy(p_eid_buffer, m_security_slot[slot_no].eid, ES_EID_ID_LENGTH);
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}
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void es_security_encrypted_eid_id_key_get(uint8_t slot_no, uint8_t * p_key_buffer)
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{
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memcpy(m_aes_ecb_lk.cleartext, m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.key, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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AES128_ECB_encrypt(m_aes_ecb_lk.cleartext, m_aes_ecb_lk.key, m_aes_ecb_lk.ciphertext);
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memcpy(p_key_buffer, m_aes_ecb_lk.ciphertext, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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void es_security_plain_eid_id_key_get(uint8_t slot_no, uint8_t * p_key_buffer)
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{
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memcpy(p_key_buffer, m_security_slot[slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.key, ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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void es_security_tlm_to_etlm(uint8_t ik_slot_no, es_tlm_frame_t * p_tlm, es_etlm_frame_t * p_etlm)
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{
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cf_prp prp; // Describe the block cipher to use.
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uint8_t plain[TLM_DATA_SIZE] = {0}; // Plaintext tlm, without the frame byte and version.
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size_t nplain = TLM_DATA_SIZE; // Length of message plaintext.
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/*lint -save -e420 */
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memcpy(plain, &p_tlm->vbatt[0], sizeof(plain));
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const uint8_t header = 0; // Additionally authenticated data (AAD).
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size_t nheader = 0; // Length of header (AAD). May be zero.
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uint8_t key[EIK_SIZE] = {0}; // Encryption/decryption key: EIK.
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size_t nkey = EIK_SIZE; // Length of encryption/decryption key.
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memcpy(key, &m_security_slot[ik_slot_no].aes_ecb_ik.key[0], EIK_SIZE);
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/*lint -restore */
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uint8_t nonce[NONCE_SIZE] = {0}; // Nonce. This must not repeat for a given key.
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size_t nnonce = NONCE_SIZE; // Length of nonce.First 4 bytes are beacon time base with k-bits cleared.
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// Last two bits are randomly generated
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// Take the current timestamp and clear the lowest K bits, use it as nonce.
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uint32_t k_bits_cleared_time = (m_security_slot[ik_slot_no].timing.time_counter
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>> m_security_slot[ik_slot_no].timing.k_scaler)
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<< m_security_slot[ik_slot_no].timing.k_scaler;
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nonce[0] = (uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time >> 24) & 0xff);
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nonce[1] = (uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time >> 16) & 0xff);
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nonce[2] = (uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time >> 8) & 0xff);
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nonce[3] = (uint8_t)((k_bits_cleared_time) & 0xff);
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// Generate random salt.
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uint8_t salt[SALT_SIZE] = {0};
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(void)sd_rand_application_vector_get(salt, SALT_SIZE);
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memcpy(&nonce[4], salt, SALT_SIZE);
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uint8_t cipher[ES_ETLM_ECRYPTED_LENGTH]; // Ciphertext output. nplain bytes are written.
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uint8_t tag[TAG_SIZE] = {0}; // Authentication tag. ntag bytes are written.
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size_t ntag = TAG_SIZE; // Length of authentication tag.
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// Encryption
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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cf_aes_context ctx;
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cf_aes_init(&ctx, key, nkey);
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prp.encrypt = (cf_prp_block)cf_aes_encrypt; // Encryption context
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prp.decrypt = (cf_prp_block)cf_aes_decrypt; // Decryption context
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prp.blocksz = ESCS_AES_KEY_SIZE;
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cf_eax_encrypt(&prp,
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&ctx,
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plain, // Plaintext input, aka TLM
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nplain, // Length of TLM
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&header, // Empty
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nheader, // Empty
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nonce, // Nonce input
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nnonce, // Length of nonce
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cipher, // Encrypted output
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tag, // Authentication tag output
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ntag // Length of authentication tag
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);
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// Construct the eTLM.
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// --------------------------------------------------------------------------
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p_etlm->frame_type = p_tlm->frame_type;
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p_etlm->version = ES_TLM_VERSION_ETLM;
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memcpy(p_etlm->encrypted_tlm, cipher, ES_ETLM_ECRYPTED_LENGTH);
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memcpy((uint8_t *)&p_etlm->random_salt, salt, SALT_SIZE);
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memcpy((uint8_t *)&p_etlm->msg_integrity_check, tag, TAG_SIZE);
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}
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ret_code_t es_security_init(es_security_msg_cb_t security_callback)
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{
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ret_code_t err_code;
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if (security_callback == NULL)
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{
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return NRF_ERROR_INVALID_PARAM;
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}
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// Get lock code from 'es_app_config.h', or fetch it from flash if exists.
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lock_code_init(m_aes_ecb_lk.key);
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m_security_callback = security_callback;
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memset(&m_ecdh, 0, sizeof(es_security_ecdh_t));
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for (uint32_t i = 0; i < APP_MAX_EID_SLOTS; ++i)
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{
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m_security_slot[i].timing.time_counter = APP_CONFIG_TIMING_INIT_VALUE;
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}
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err_code = es_stopwatch_create(&m_seconds_passed_sw_id, APP_TIMER_TICKS(1000, APP_TIMER_PRESCALER));
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APP_ERROR_CHECK(err_code);
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return NRF_SUCCESS;
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}
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